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ABSTRACT 
A model  to  value Federal  Agricultural  Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) agricultural 
mortgage-backed securities (AMBS) is developed and numerically solved. The results sug- 
gest prepayment  penalties  currently being  used  by  Farmer  Mac reduce  yields  on AMBS 
considerably.  Even with prepayment penalties, it can be advantageous for protit maximiz- 
ing mortgagors to optimally  prepay or even default on agricultural mortgages. The model 
is used  to  quantify  prepayment  and default  risk by  valuing  the embedded options in  thc 
~nortgages.  Monte  Carlo simulation is  also used  to determine the  probability  of  optimal 
prepayment  given the term structure assumption  used to develop the model. 
Key Words: cigrit~rrlturul  mortgage-bucked sec.uritirs, tfqf~~~rlt,  tlynurnic prograrninirzg, sin7 
ulution, prepuymerzf. 
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The mid- 1980s were a difficult  time for agri- 
cultural  lending.  As  Barkema,  Drabenstott, 
and Froerer (1988) note, an agricultural reces- 
sion led to widespread loan  defaults, causing 
the Farm Credit System (FCS) to lose over $2 
billion  in  1985.  Mounting  losses  combined 
with a legislative desire to decrease budget ex- 
penditures resulted  in a reorganization  of the 
agricultural lending system that culminated in 
the Agricultural Credit Act of  1987. Some of 
the [nost significant changes brought about by 
this legislation are found in Title VII, which 
established the Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation. The Federal  Agricultural  MOI-t- 
gage Corporation, also known as Farmer Mac, 
is  a  federally  chartered  corporation  charged 
with  providing  a  secondary  market  for agri- 
cultural real estate loans. 
Most  research  relating  to mortgages  and 
secondary mortgage markets has been directed 
at residential mortgages. This is likely  attrib- 
utable to the size of the residential (non-farm) 
secondary  mortgage  market  which  in  1998 
represented  8  I .9 percent of all mortgage debt 
and  was  a  staggering  $4.738  trillion  (U.S. 
Census Bureau). By contrast.  commercial 
mortgage  debt  made up  16.4 percent  of  all 
mortgage debt while farm mortgage debt made 
up the balance of 1.6 percent. While small rel- 
ative to the other categories, farm mortgage 
debt continues to grow and was a record $95 
billion in  1998 (U.S. Census Bureau). 
The three  classifications  of  mortgage debt 
above  share  similarities  and  differences  that 
have implications  for valuation  models of  ag- 
ricultural mortgage-backed securities (AMBS). 
Commercial  and  agricultural  mortgages  are 
similar in Inany respects, not the least of which 
is that loan performance is more readily tied to 
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of the niortgaged asset as well because volatile  made after  1996 include prepayment penalties 
commodity prices andor commodity yields af-  (FAMC  1999). Interestingly,  a  recent  GAO 
fect the ability of the mortgagor to service the  survey  of  1ender.s indicated  that  they  would 
mortgage.  By  contrast,  loan  performance  is  likely  use  Farmer  Mac  more  if  prepayment 
more closely tied to demographic variables and  penalties  were  eliminated. The report  recog- 
the (typically non-volatile)  personal  income of  nizes that the elimination of  prepayment pen- 
the  mortgagor in the  case of residential  mort-  alties  would  increase  the  prepayment  risk 
gages.  faced by Farmer Mac. which might necessitate 
As  Kelly  and  Slawson  (2000) note,  resi-  charging borrowers higher interest rates. High- 
dential mortgages are also highly standardized  er interest  rates  might  also precipitate higher 
relative to commercial mortgages where terms  default risk in the event of a economic down- 
are more complex  and  heterogeneous. While  turn  ill  the agricultural sector. 
agricultural mortgages are also fairly standard-  Given the key differences between agricul- 
ired, the terms tend  to be different than those  tural  mortgages  and  mortgages and the 
for  residential  mortgages.  For  example,  the  fact that no  pricing Inodeis of the current  in- 
typical  residential  mortgage  requires  a mini-  carnation  the  F~~~~~  M~~  program  cur- 
mum down payment of 5 Percent of the lesser  rently  exist  in  the  literature.  the  central  pur- 
of purchase price and appraised value. Agricul-  pose  of  this  paper  is  to  present  an  AMBS 
tural real estate mortgages are more apt to im-  Inode\  that  is  nlore  with 
pose  a minimum  down  payrnent of 25 percent  some of the features of.  agricultural real estate 
33 Percent  On  the mortgagee. The  and mortgages. To this end, we apply a variant 
higher down  paytnent  mitigate  the ad-  existing analytic models  of  mortgage- 
ditional risk of default attributable to the mort-  backed  pricing to the case  AMBS, 
gaged asset's  financial  performance volatility.  The  model  significantly  extends Chhikal.rl 
Higher down payments also insulate the mart-  and  Hanson  in  ways, most 
gagee from some of the relative illiquiclity as-  with respect to prepayment penalties, 
sociated  with  agricultural  real  estate (another  sub-optimal prepayment and default are close- 
key  difference between agricultural  and resi- 
ly  tied  to  the  financial  performance  of  the 
dential  real  estate). Other differences include  mortgaged  asset  in  the  agl-icultural  case, we 
repayment frequency, which is typically semi-  model  agricult~~ral  land  values  as a diffusion 
annual  for agricultural  mortgages, and  matu-  process and allow the probabilities of sub-op- 
rities that rarely go beyond  20 years.  timal  default and prepayment to be  function- 
Another  important  difference  is  that  resi-  ally  related  to  the  service flow  of  the  asset. 
dential  mortgages  can  be  prepaid  and  rarely 
Prepayment penalties used by  Farmer Mac are 
impose prepayment penalties in such an event. 
analyzed to determine the implications for the 
This is  in  stark contrast  to commercial mort- 
cost of capital facing potential mortgagors and  gages  that  in  some cases cannot be prepaid 
the risk protection they provide investors. The  and agricultural mortgages where prepayment 
model is also used to value the embedded op-  triggers  a penalty.'  All  Farmer  Mac  I  loans 
tions to (optimally) default and prepay and to 
determine equilibrium interest rates that might 
1  For  example,  Farm  Credit  System  banks  offer 
three  of loans in this catepory.  which  are re.  induce a potential borrower to take a loan with 
ferred  to  as  the  Prepcljrnc>nt  Prerniltm  I.oarl  Options  a prepayment penalty. We also empirically an- 
(PPLO).  Under the Multiflex option. loans can bc pre-  alyze the extent to which Farmel- Mac prepay- 
paid or converted to another type of  loan with little or  ment penal ties actual1  y preclude optimal pre- 
no penalty. Another PPLO, called the F1e.w  option, cor- 
to  Farlner  Mac's  partial  open  prepayment  payment given the term  we assume' 
. . 
structure and ofltrs a lower rate than the M~~ltiflex  op- 
tion. The Exceptional Rate option is a PPLO that offers  An Analytical  Mode[ t~  Value  AMBS 
the lowest intcr.cst rate, but does not allow prepnyment 
tluring  the tixed  ratc  pcriod  without  assessment of  a 
severe  much  like Farmer  Mac-s yield  n,ainte.  Derivative securities take their name from the 
nance provisions.  fact that  they  "derive"  thcir  valuc  from  the value of  some other asset. Valuing  derivative 
securities is typically done by determining the 
set  of  assets that  influence  the  value  of  the 
derivative and assuming the  evolution of  the 
value of these assets can be tnodeled with sto- 
chastic differential  equations. Next, Ito's lem- 
ma is applied to determine the dynamics of the 
derivative and  arbitrage or equilibrium argu- 
ments are made so the resulting model can be 
solved. 
As an example, suppose the time r value of 
a (derivative) security depends on the value of 
another asset whose level is given by X(t). Let 
F[X(t). t] denote the  value  of  the  derivative 
and assume X(t) Sollows geometric Brownian 
motion  where  clX  = aXc2't  +  PXciZ.  The dy- 
namics of F(.) can be Sound by  applying Ito's 
lemma to get clE'  = F,dX  + %F,,cIX'  + FPt 
where subscripts denote partial differentiation. 
Provided  the  security  pay\  no  other  cash 
flows, dE' then represents the capital gain froin 
holding the security which should equal some 
expected return in equilibrium. That is, E(dF) 
= pFrlt. Substituting for tlX and dX2  above and 
taking  the  relevant  expectation  implies 
%(PX)'F,,  +  (aX)F,  +  F, - pF = 0 is  an 
equation whose solution characterizes the val- 
ue  of  the  derivative. Additional  arbitrage or 
equilibrium  arguments  can  sometimes  be 
made to eliminate the generally unobservable 
parameter  [I. 
The AMBS model we develop is based on 
existing pricing  models for interest  rate con- 
tingent claims [see for example, Brennan and 
Schwartz  ( 1977), Buser  and  Hendershott 
( 1984), Cunningham and Hendershott ( 1984), 
Foster and Van  Order ( 1984), Cox, lngersoll. 
and Ross ( 1985a and 1985b), Green and Shov- 
en ( 1986). Stanton ( 1995). and Deng, Quigley, 
and Van  Order (2000)  1 .' 
Pooled  loans are assumed to be fully  arn- 
ortizing  mortgages for productive agricultural 
real  estate with  outstanding principal  F(t) at 
time  r.  The loans  are homogeneous  with  re- 
spect to terms  and have a fixed  continuously 
'  Exi\ting pricing model\ are set in continuous time 
and we maintain this convention in what follow\ prin- 
cipally  because  the  stochastic calculi  arc particularly 
well  si~ited  for this type of  analyhi\. 
compounded  coupon  rate,  r*, for  a  term  to 
maturity of  T years. The amortizing feature of 
the loans implies a payment of C = r*F(O)l(l 
-  e1  l)dt is required to retire F(t) by the ma- 
turity time T.  In  the absence oT  prepayment or 
default, the dynamics of the loan principal bal- 
ance is described by  the ordinary differential 
equation  dF(t) =  [r4:F(f) - Cldt  implying 
principal outstanding at any time t is given by 
the solution to this ordinary differential equa- 
tion, namely, F(t) = {F(O)I  I  -  P  (l-fl]}/(l  - 
-'  r  ) . We assume the mortgagor can prepay 
the  loan  at any time, but  faces a prepayment 
penalty for doing so. Prepayment penalties are 
denoted by  8,[r(t),  L(t), t], where i  = yrn de- 
notes yield  maintenance and  i  = pp  denotes 
partial-open prepayment.' 
Uncertainty  in  the  economy  is  character- 
ized  by  the  probability  space  (R, y,  Q) in 
which R is the state space, !F  is the a-algebra 
representing measurable events, and Q is the 
risk-neutral probability  measure. The spot rate 
of interest evolves according to the stochastic 
differential  equation  dr(t) =  K[F  - r(t)]  + 
av(t)'12dZ(t) with  the  usual  interpretation  of 
the  parameter^.^ Zit) is a Q-Brownian motion 
with  EQ[dZ(t)l = 0 where  EQ represents the 
expectation  operator  under  the  risk-neutral 
probability  measure Q. 
Land values, Lit), are assumed to follow a 
diffusion  given by  clL(t) = (a - v)L(t)dt  + 
PL(t)riW(t) where a is the instantaneous total 
expected  return,  P  is  the  instantaneous  pro- 
portionate variance, and  v  represents the rate 
at which income flows to the owner of the land 
froin employing it in an agricultural capacity.' 
'  As the analytic model  to  be developed does not 
depend on the functional form of any specific prepay- 
ment penalty. a di\cu\.;ion  of the fi~nctional  form of 0, 
and  its relevant  argument(s) is deferred to a  later scc- 
tion of  the papen 
In  their intertemporal  general  equilibrium model, 
Cox, Ingcraoll, and  Koss (1 985b) derive the dynamics 
of  the specified  \pot  interest  rate  under very  specific 
assumptions  relating to  the  agents and  the economy. 
As  we are relying on this  specific  diffusion, we are 
also relying on all the assumption\ Cox, Ingersoll, and 
Koss (1985b) made to derive it. 
'  This "income  flow"  is analogous to thc "\ervice 
flow"  found in the residential real estate literature, nei- 
ther of which the mortgage-backcd sccurity holder has W(t)  is  a P-Brownian motion  with EpldW(t)]  ( I  with probabiliry 
= 0, and EP is an expectation operator under  +/'[r.(t),  L(r),  tldt 
probability measure P.  (2)  rly(t) = 
0  with probability 
"Sub-optimal  default"  is  modeled  as  a  I  - (J)/l[l,(f),  f>(t),  tldf. 
Poisson  random  variable.  x(t), which  equals 
zero as long as the mortgagor does not default 
on the  loan.  This type of default  arises sto- 
chastically  for  any  number  of  (unspecified) 
reasons and differs from "optimal default"  be- 
cause the latter is the mortgagor's  response to 
a decline in  the underlying asset's  value. The 
incidence of sub-optimal default is represented 
by  x(t) instantaneously  jumping  to  one  and 
causes the loan to exit the pool. Therefore, the 
dynamics of sub-optimal default are given by: 
I  I  with probability 
1  @'[r(f),  Ut),  tldr 
(I)  = 10  with probability 
where +"[r(t),  L(t), t]  At  is  the instantaneous 
probability  of  default  occurring  at  time  t 
which,  as indicated, can depend on the  spot 
rate, land values, and time. 
"Sub-optimal  prepayment"  is  also  mod- 
eled as a Poisson random variable. ~(t),  which 
ecli~als  zero as long as the mortgagor does not 
prepay the loan. This type of prepayment aris- 
es stochastically for any number of (unspeci- 
fied) reasons  and differs from  "optimal  pre- 
payment"  which is  the mortgagor's  response 
to a decline in interest rates. The incidence of 
sub-optimal prepayment is represented by y(t) 
instantaneously jumping to one. As in the case 
of sub-optimal default, the loan also ceases to 
exist when prepayment occurs. Therefore. the 
dynamics of sub-optimal prepayment are giv- 
en by: 
any  claim  to.  Also.  by  "agricultural  capacity"  we 
mean  that  the  mortgaged asset  is being farmed, either 
by  the mortgagor directly (31.  indirectly through a leas- 
ing arrangement with a 'lrmer.  In the case of  3 l'i~r~ner 
rnortgagol-,  vL(t)  represents the residual  return to  land. 
In the  case of  an absentee owncr, the  precise form of 
the  Ica\ing arrangcrnent dererrnincs the  interpretation 
of  vL(r).  For example, in a cash rental agreement vL(1) 
is  the  cash relit  the  farmer pays  to  the  landowncl- for 
the right to  farm the  land. 
The instantaneous  probability  of prepayment 
occurring at time t is @'(I-(t),  L(t),  t]dt  and. as 
shown, also can depend on the spot rate, land 
values, and time." 
Finally,  the price of a contingent claim on 
the loans  in  the  pool  is  given  by  the  value 
functional  V = V(L(t),  r(t),  .u(t),  !.(I).  t] where 
the arguments are as defined by  the preceding 
assumptions. From this point forward we also 
suppress explicit  time  and  f-unctional clepen- 
dence where no confusion can arise. 
The Fun~l~~rr~eiztril  PDE for A MBS 
Given the preceding as\umption\, the funda- 
mental  PDE  characteri~ing  the  value  of 
AMBS can be \hewn  to be 
Equation (3) is  similar to equations presented 
by Titman and Tol-ous (1989), and  Kau et (11. 
(1 992),  with a couple of exceptions. The equa- 
tion  is  also  recognized  as  the  fundamental 
equation characterizing  a  number of interest- 
rate  contingent  claims  including  the  risky 
mortgage,  mortgage  insurance,  as  well  as 
mortgage-backed  securities.  One  difference 
between  equation (3)  and the PDE character- 
izing residential  mortgage-backed securities is 
the  existence of  the  prepayment  penalty,  0,. 
Another difference.  which  we return  to in  a 
'' The specific functional forms ol' the probabilities. 
9"lr-(f),  L(r),  tltlr and &'lr-(t),  l.(r), tltll are addressed in 
3 li~tcr  section of paper. Stokrs  rr~~cl  8rinc.h: Vtrl~rir~~  Agric.lllllcrul i2Io1~fgc~,qc~-Ruckr~1  Sec.~t/-iric,.\ 
later section of the paper, is the nature of  the 
probabilities  of  cub-optimal  default  and  pre- 
payment. 
In  equation (3),  A  I\ the market price of risk 
and  p  I\  the  in\tantaneou\  correlation coefti- 
cient  between  interest  rates  and  land  values. 
All  the parameters  in equation (3) can be ob- 
served  (and  therefhre  estimated)  except  A. 
However,  according  to  Kau  et  trl.  (1993, 
1995). the parameter can be  set eclual to zero 
under  either  of  two  (diffcrcnt) assumptions. 
The market price of risk can be assumed to be 
included  in  the  term  stri~cti~re  parameters  K 
and  or it can  be  assumed  the local  expec- 
tations hypothesis (LEH) holds. Under rhis lat- 
ter  assumption.  A  = 0 because  the  LEH  im- 
plies that the spot interest rate r(t)  contains all 
information  available  at  time  t  regarding  fu- 
ture  interest  rates. More detailed  information 
about the  LEH  and  a  technical  mathen~atical 
definition  can  be  found  in  Musiela and  Rut- 
kowski  ( 1998). Consistent  with  much  tixed- 
income research, it is assumed  A  = 0 because 
the L2EH holds. 
To  fully specify the AMBS model. bound- 
ary conditions and an initial condition for the 
PDE (3)  are required. The initial condition is 
sirnply  V(L,  r, .r, y, T)  = 0 given the amortiz- 
ing feature of  the mortgage. As noted  above, 
the mortgagor possesses the option to call the 
loan  at any time. but  is  subject to  a prepay- 
ment penalty for doing so. While sub-optimal 
prepayment is governed by  a Poisson process. 
optimal prepayment of the mortgage is driven 
by  the  interest  rate  diffusion  process  and the 
pt-otit-seeking motive of the mortgagor. When 
the spot interest rate falls below  some trigger 
level  or  value.  the  loan  will  be  optimally 
calleci by  the mortgagor. This optimal call pol- 
icy results in  the principal oi~tstanding  serving 
as a boundary  for the value  of the  mortgage, 
V(L,  r, .I-, y, t) 5 F'(t). 
Similarly, it is optimal for the mortgagor to 
default  ;it  any time t if  the value of the mol-t- 
gaged asset falls below the market value of the 
mortgage. Therefore,  V(L, r,  .u,  y,  r) 5  LAt) 
prior  to  maturity  [Schwartz  and  Torous 
(1993)). We  also  assume  the  solution  to (3) 
has bounded derivatives and that the following 
conditions hold 
(4)  limV(L,r,x.  \.f)=O  and 
, ,I 
These boundary conditions are relatively stan- 
dard  given equation  (3). For more detail, see 
for example, Titman and Tor-ous. ( 1992). 
Unlike  mortgage-backed  securities  issued  by 
other  GSEs such  as  Ginnie  Mae or Freddie 
Mac,  AMBS issued  under the Farmer Mac  I 
program  have  a  guaranteed  yield. The guar- 
anteed yield is supposed to make AMBS more 
attractive to investors than standard mortgage- 
backed  securities. To  be  able to promise  in- 
vestors  a  guaranteed  yield  on  its  securities 
without  over  exposing  itself  to risk,  Farmer 
Mac  includes  a  prepayment  penalty  in  the 
terms of the loans it pools. 
Yield  maintenance  is  the  most  common 
prepayment penalty  used  by  Farmer Mac and 
assesses the mortgagor a penalty such that the 
seciuity holder is  made  "whole"  in  terms of 
the  expected  cash  flows  over the  life  of  the 
loan. The yield  maintenance prepayment pen- 
alty used by  Farmer Mac is given by 
where q is equal to  1  percent, and R = K(r, t, 
7) is  the  yield  on  the  interpolated  Treasury 
Constant  Maturity  maturing  on  the  "yield 
maintenance  date"  which  is  denoted  by  T.' 
Notice  T  < T because  in  practice, the  "yield 
mainten:~r~ce  date"  occurs (six months) before 
loan  maturity. 
The  econonly  that  supports  the  assumed 
spot-rate dynamics also allows for a ccxnplete 
characterization of the term  structure. That is, 
'Equation  (5)  is ac~u:~lly  thc continuous ti~nc  ana- 
logue of the discrcte timc  yield  maintenance penalty 
eclu:\tion  Farrncr Mac  LLS~S. bonds of  any maturity can be priced under the 
assumptions  laid  out  by  Cox,  Ingersoll,  and 
Ross  (1985b)  and  these  prices  can  then  be 
used  to  infer the  corresponding  yield  needed 
in equation  (5). The time t price, P(r, t. T), of 
a  bond  maturing  at  T  is  PO.,  t,  T) = A(t,  r) 
exp[-B(t,  r)~.(t)l  where A(t, T) and B(t, T) are 
coefficient functionals given by  equation (23) 
of  Cox,  Ingersoll,  and  Ross  (1 98%).  The 
yield-to-~naturity,  K(r, t, r), thr bonds  priced 
in  this  manner  is  given  by  equation  (25) of 
Cox, Ingersoll, ~uid  ROSS  (I%%),  namely. 
[rB(t,  T) - log Act, 711 
(0)  R(t-,  1.  T)  = 
(T -  f) 
Intuitively,  yield  maintenance  is  designed 
to capture the present value of the interest that 
the investor forgoes as a result of the prepay- 
ment. It does appear this penalty overstates the 
actual interest lost over the loan's life because 
of  the  fully  amortizing  feat~ue  of  the  loan. 
Also note that this type of prepayment penalty 
is a function of the r and t state variables, but 
not L. 
A Inore recent development is partial open 
prepayment  loans,  which  Farmer Mac  intro- 
duced in  1998. Under this plan, the mortgagor 
pays a prepayment penalty for an initial period 
of the  loan's  life. after which  no prepayment 
penalty  is assessed. The structure currently in 
use  assesses  a  declining  penalty  for the  tirst 
two and a half years, 
where t, represents the time of the first sched- 
uled  payment, t2 is one year after t,,  and  r, is 
two years after t,. Additionally, 6,, j  = 1. 2, 3 
represents the percentage of  F(t) that  is paid 
in  the  form  of  a  penalty.  Currently,  6, = 9 
percent,  6? - 8 percent.  and  6,  = 7  percent 
for  Farmer  Mac  partial  open  prepayment 
loans. 
The Empirical Model to Value AMBSX 
Several discretization techniques may be used 
(in lieu of  an analytic solution) to solve PDEs 
like equation (3) such as tinite differencing or 
simulation. Numerical integration or differenc- 
ing  is  the  most  common  method  (see e.g. 
Dunn  and  McConnell  (I981  );  Brennan  and 
Schwartz  (1985); Kau  et ul.  ( 1992,  1995)l. 
However, the presence of multiple  state vari- 
ables coupled  with  frequent  embedded  early 
exercise opportunities greatly complicates the 
irnplernentation of a differencing methodology 
ISchwartz  and  TOI-ous  (1989)l. Therefore.  a 
combination  Monte Carlo sim~tlation/dynamic 
programming  approach  was  developed to 
solve the PDE (3) and  value the AMBS. 
Monte Carlo sirnulation  is often used to price 
options and other derivative securities [see  e.g. 
Boyle  (1977'1; Schwart~  and  Toroils  (1989); 
Boyle.  Broadie,  and  Glasserman  ( 1997)  1. 
Broadie  and  Glassel-man  (1997) present  the 
state of the art in numerical option pricing and 
also appear to have  pioneered  the most  con- 
temporary  pricing  technique.  In  their  ap- 
proach, they utilize simulation combined with 
dynamic  programming  to  develop  two  esti- 
mates of  the  price  of  an  American  stock op- 
tion.  This  methodology  simulates  a  non-re- 
combining  lattice  of  stock  prices  and  then 
proceeds  backward  through  a  portion  of  the 
lattice to determine an optimal exercise policy 
and two current values of the option. The two 
option price estimates, one of  which is biased 
high while the other is biased low. are proven 
to  be  asymptotically  consistent  esti~nators  of 
the  "true"  option price. 
One problem with this methodology  is the 
excessive  storage  requirements  necessary  to 
'In  this  section,  time  is  denoted  with  \nbscript.; 
rnthcr  than  the  previous  convention  to  highlight  Ihc 
diff'erencc hct\vccn the continuous ti111e  ~u~alytic  model 
ant1 the discrete time empirical model  ~~\ccl  to solve tl~e 
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implement  the  technique.The  approach  is 
more  appropriate for  Bermudan  options  than 
for the problem at  hand  because of  its reliance 
on the generation of  all  the paths  for the state 
variables  before the application of the back- 
ward  recursion required  of the dynamic pro- 
gramming algorithm. One feasible way to cir- 
cumvent  the  storage  problem  is  to  utilize  a 
path-wise  simulation  method,  which  trades 
Ttorage for computation time. In this approach, 
state variable paths  are  simulated stochastical- 
ly one  at  a time and  the method  of  dynamic 
programming  is applied to each simulated path 
to generate  one  current  value  of the  AMBS. 
This process  is repeated  a large  number  of 
times  and  the  value  of the  AMBS  is deter- 
mined  by calculating the average of  the cur- 
rent  values. This average will  converge to the 
true value given that the distributional and  oth- 
er  assumptions of  the model hold. This is the 
approach implemented  to solve equation (3). 
The  diffusions that  are  simulated  when 
pricing  AMBS  are  the discretized  versions of 
the term-structure-diffusion  equation and  risk- 
neutralized  land-value-diffusion  equation. The 
risk-neutralized  land-value-diffusion equation 
is determined  in the usual  way by finding  an 
appropriate  change  of measure  for  the  land 
value  diffusion. Such a change in  measure is 
easily obtained  given  the Cox, Ingersoll, and 
Ross  economy  and  the  assumption  that  land 
values follow geometric  Brownian motion. 
Time-steps in the empirical  model  are  set 
at  1/12 which  is consistent  with monthly  re- 
alization  of the  stochastic  elements  of the 
model.  Functions  developed  by  Press  rt al. 
(1993) are  used  to draw  two correlated  stan- 
dard  normal variates (one for the spot rate and 
one for land  values) and  two Poisson random 
variates (one each for sub-optimal prepayment 
and  default) at  each time step. After one com- 
plete  set  of  time paths  has been simulated, one 
possible  time zero  value  of the  value  of the 
AMBS  is calculated by backing up along this 
set  of paths  and  applying  the  dynamic  pro- 
gramming algorithm. 
The  mortgagor  makes  two  decisions  at 
each time point-whether  or not to optimally 
prepay  or  optimally default. Because exercise 
of each option  is triggered  by  different con- 
ditions, it is necessary to implement a hierar- 
chy  to  check  for  optimal  exercise.  At  each 
point  the decision to optimally prepay  is ex- 
amined  first. Optimal prepayment  is governed 
by boundary conditions, though in the context 
of the  empirical  model  optimal  prepayment 
will  occur if rj' > r, + 5 + 5 + y,,  where [  is 
the percentage  loan markup, [ is the percent- 
age  cost of  refinancing, and  y, is the percent- 
age cost of  the prepayment penalty. Recall that 
prepayment  penalties  are  determined  via  the 
yield  maintenance or  partial-open prepayment 
equations  and  are  measured  in  dollar  terms. 
Therefore,  prepayment penalties  must be con- 
verted  into  their  basis  point  equivalent. The 
conversion is accomplished by amortizing the 
prepayment  penalty  and  remaining  loan  bal- 
ance  over  the  remaining  number  of periods 
and  determining an  equivalent basis point  cost 
of  the penalty. 
If it is optimal for the mortgagor to prepay 
at  time t, the value of  the AMBS  is 
'I A\  Broadic  and  Glasqerman  (I  997) point  out, 
their technique  i\ exponential in the number of exercise 
opportunities. If  four state variable paths are simulated 
with  monthly  exercise opportunities  for 30  years  (as 
might be the case when pricing holuc loans and assum- 
ing that  optimal  prepayment  and default  arc monthly 
occurrences), the numher of terminal nodes will  be on 
the order of  1.670 X  10"'.  In addition, the total number 
of  values that  must  be  stored  is even greater because 
the entire lattice must be  saved  lor the dynamic pro- 
gramming application. If each value is stored as a (sin- 
gle precision) Iloating point varinblc with a storage re- 
quirement of 8 bytes,  it  i\ apparent  that the  memory 
and storage rcq~iirenlcnts  for this methodology q~~ickly 
make  it impracticable (approximately 128 gigabytes to 
.;tore ju\t the terminal nodes) 
IF,  + $, + 8,,  otherwise 
where the variable ((I,  measures accrued  inter- 
est from the time of  the previous  payment and 
t. Accrued  interest is necessary  because  it  is 
assumed  there are  monthly exercise  opportu- 
nities,  which  differs from  the  frequency  of 
payments  (i.e. payments  are  semi-annual  for 
Farmer  Mac  mortgages). 
If optimal prepayment  is unwarranted, the 
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mally  default. If  optimal  default occurs,  the 
value  of the AMBS is simply  V,  = F',.  Tech- 
nically. Farmer Mac does try to collect a pre- 
payment penalty in the event of default. How- 
ever. the actual incidence of penalty collection 
is low  enough that  this  can be  ignored. Ad- 
ditionally,  optimal  default should only  occur 
in a month in which a payment is due because 
the  mortgagor  will  try  to maintain  control  of 
the asset as long as possible before defaulting. 
If  neither  optimal  prepayment  or optimal 
default occur, the final conditions to check for 
are sub-optimal prepayment and default. Sub- 
optimal prepayment occurs if  the Poisson ran- 
dom  variable  is equal  to  I  at time  t.  If  sub- 
optinla1 prepayment occurs, the value function 
is the same as equation (8).  Likewise, sub-op- 
titnal default will occur if the Poisson random 
variable is equal to  1. The value function un- 
der sub-optimal default is also the same as that 
of  optimal default, namely,  V, = F,. 
If neither of the mortgagor's options are ex- 
ercised and sub-optimal prepayment or default 
does  not  occur,  the  scheduled  payment  is 
passed through to the AMBS investor and the 
loan is continued. In this case, the value of the 
AMBS is given by  the dynamic programming 
recursive relation  V,-,,  = C + V,/(I  +  r- ,-,,  ). 
Intuitively, this relation represents the contin- 
uation value of the mortgage. Notice also that 
the  notation  V,~  .,  explicitly  shows the  back- 
ward  recursive  nature  of  the  dynamic  pro- 
gramming algorithm and allows for a non-sto- 
chastic  implementation  of  the  algorithm 
because the path of each state variable is sto- 
chastically  si~nulated  before  the algorithm  is 
applied. Successful implementation of  the 
path-wise  simulationldynamic  programming 
approach  allows  for  a  numerical  approxima- 
tion  to  V  by  generating  a  distribution  of 
AMBS values at  all points in  time. 
Recall  that  the  simulation/dynamic  pro- 
gramn~ing  approach  detailed  here  was  de- 
signed to circumvent some of the problems as- 
sociated  with  storage  intensity  by  trading 
storage for computation time. It should be not- 
ed  that  nun~erically  approximating  V in  the 
manner suggested  is still  no small tahk. High 
initial interest rate scenarios can take over I80 
minutes  to  determine  a mean  value  of  V  at 
time  zero on  a  Pentium  I1  with  a 4.50-mHz 
processor.  lo 
The functional forms of  sub-optimal prepay- 
ment and default can take many forms. Dunn 
and  McConnell use Federal  Housing Author- 
ity  (FHA) experience to characterize the fre- 
quency  of  sub-optimal  prepayment.  Later 
work.  such as that by  Kau  rt a/. (1992) and 
Hanson and Chhikara (1993), uses Public Se- 
curities Association  (PSA) experience to rep- 
resent  nonfinancial  termination.  PSA  experi- 
ence  seeks  to  capture  the  reduced  level  of 
prepayment by  mortgagors early in the life of 
a loan while allowing for higher probability of 
prepayment  as tirne  passes.  Use  of  PSA  ex- 
perience  to represent sub-optimal  prepayment 
in  an  agricultural  setting  probably  misrepre- 
sents the incidence of sub-optimal prepayment 
because PSA experience is derived from (pri- 
maril y month1  y  ) residential  mortgage prepay - 
rnent  data.  Also,  as  noted  by  Brennan  and 
Schwartz (1 985), PSA does not distinguish be- 
tween  optimal  and  sub-optimal  prepayment 
which  necessarily  implies PSA overstates the 
frequency of sub-optimal prepayment. 
In  agriculture, the  ability  of  a land owner 
to service a mortgage for agricultural  real  es- 
tate is heavily tied to the financial performance 
of the mortgaged  asset. This idea is also con- 
sistent with con~mercial  and Farm Credit  As- 
sociation  lenders'  preferences  for  self-liqui- 
dating loans. Sub-optimal default is inevitable 
if  conditions in  the agricultural  economy (i.e. 
low commodity prices andlor low commodity 
yields)  are  poor.  Similarly.  favorable  condi- 
tions  in  the  agricultural  economy  can  bring 
about significant income in a given year such 
"' High initial interest rates arc comp~~tationnlly  in- 
tensive because the spot rate diffusion irnplies interest 
rates will gravitate toward their Ions-term mean valuc. 
As such. the spot  rate falls over tirnc,  implying more 
potential  for prepayment. To  determine  whether  pre- 
payment  under  yield  rnaintenilnce  should  occur,  tbr- 
ward  rates  must  be  determined  and  the  prepayment 
penalty  must be convertetl to a bazis point equivalent. 
both  of  which  add  significantly  to the  computation 
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that the probability  of  (sub-optimal) prepay- 
ment is increased. " 
In the present model we link the probabil- 
ity  of sub-optimal  prepayment and default to 
conditions  in  the  agricultural  economy  by 
specifying $1'  and +I'  to be functionally related 
to the financial performance of the mortgaged 
asset  through  vL, the  income the  mortgagor 
receives from the use of the asset in  an agri- 
cultural capacity. While such a linkage is plau- 
sible. it offers the advantage of rnarginal com- 
plexity.  That  is,  no ~~dditional  state variables 
need  to be  specified  and the model does not 
become more complex than it presently is. 
While any functional form could  be  used. 
for sirnplicity the probability of prepayment is 
awumed to be a linear function of the differ- 
ence  between  actual  and  expected  Income 
flow. Therefore, the probability ot \ub-optlnial 
prepayment i\ given by 
where 6;;  and $('  are constants. Given the as- 
sumed  parameter  signs  in  ecluation  (9). the 
probability  of  sub-optimal  prepayment  in- 
creases as the actual flow of income exceeds 
expectations. 
It  remains  to define the nature of the ex- 
pected  income  How,  Eu(vL,),  appearing  in 
equation (9). One way to specify the term  is 
to take the expectation of the risk-neutralized 
diffusion  equation  for the  residual  return  to 
land which yields EQ(dL) = (r - v)Ldt. This 
result  can  be  viewed  as  a  first-order,  linear. 
ordinary  differential  eq~~ation  with  variable 
coefficients (given the expectation EQ).  An in- 
tegral representation of a \elution to thi\ eclLla- 
tion is 
assuming  that  the  initial  land  value  equal\ 
" It should be noted that. fol- \implicity.  wc ignore 
delinclucncy  and  curtailment  even  lho~lgh  thcse  are 
more  apt  to precede outright  default  ant1 pl-epilyrnenl 
in the manner supgesteri. 
L(0).  Given the expectation  then, the income 
flow at t depends only on the initial land value 
and the spot rate path  up to t. 
Because v is ;I  constant, we have EJQ[vL(t)l 
= ~jEV[Ltt)l.  Using this result and discretizing 
equation ( 10) results  in 
Thus.  in  risk-neutral  terms  the  expected  in- 
come flow at t is simply the initial (time zero) 
income flow compounded at the difference bc- 
tween the spot rate and the I-ate of income flow 
thr t  periods (months). Because the dynamic 
programming  algorithm  requires  a  I-ecul-sive 
relationship at each point, equation (1  1 ) is irn- 
pleliiented  in  the  empirical  model  as 
E,u(vL, ,,)  = vL,(I + r,~,, - v) at each point. 
Sub-optimal default  is also assumed to be 
dependent  on  the  difference  between  actual 
and  expected  inco~ne  flow.  The  functional 
form  of  the  sub-optimal  tlef;u~lt function  is 
similar to that  specified in  (9).  namely 
( 12)  d);'  = ct,;;  - ({);'I  ijl,,  --  Ei'( L~L,  )] 
+;(.  m;' ;  0. 
where $;j  and +;/ are constants. Thus. the prob- 
ability of sub-optimal default increases as rx- 
pected  inconle  flow  exceeds  actual  income 
flow. The numerical  implementation of  equa- 
tion ( 12)  is carried out in an analogous manner 
to that of ccluation (9). 
Data 
Term \tructure p:~rarneter\ u\ed  I\ the an  a  I-  V\I\ 
are est~mated  u\lng  the  procedure  \ugge\ted 
by  Nownian  using  monthly  yield  data  made 
available by  the  Federal  Reserve  t'or  U.  S. 
Treasury  Constant Maturity  securities fat. the 
period  April  1953 to July  3000 (566 ohsel-- 
vations).  The  estimation  reveals  K  equals 
0.007773,  tr2  equals 0.000257  and  I*  equals 
6.9  18.3 percent. The presence of p.  v. and p in 
equation  (3) also neces5itates  an estimate of 
the volatility of lalid values. the rate of income 
flow,  and the corl-clation coefficient  between 
land values and interest  rates. The parametel- p  was  also estimated  using  Nowman's  tech- 
nique while techniques suggested by  Gemmill 
were used  to estimate v and  p  from cash rent 
data published by the USDA ERS for  1967 to 
1994  (28 annual  observations). Cash  rent  is 
assurned  to  proxy  the income  flow  the mort- 
gagor could receive  (or actually does receive 
in the case of  an absentee owner) if  the  land 
were rented. The estimation reveals  P equals 
13.4566 percent annually, v equals 4.0076 per- 
cent annually. while p equals  -0.0542. 
One of  the  big  unknowns  for investors of 
Farmer Mac securities is borrower prepayment 
behavior for agricultural mortgages and Fnr-m- 
er Mac continues to work  to help resolve this 
issue. Data art' not available for the estimation 
of the parameters of the sub-optimal functions 
given by  equations (9) and (12) so these val- 
ues are assumed. Empirically, the linear prob- 
ability  model  describing  sub-optimal prepay- 
ment and default are 
As  the  empirical    nod el  prices  AMBS  per 
$100  of outstallding  loan  balance.  the actual 
numerical  values  used  in  equations  (13) and 
( 14) arc less tangible than might be expected. 
For  illustrative  purposes.  Figure  I  shows an 
example  of  the  sub-optimal  prepayment  and 
default probability functions generated by  (1  3) 
and ( 14) given the assumed parameter values. 
The functional forms for the  probabilities 
of  sub-optimal  prepayment  and  default  con- 
trast  to  prepayment  and  ciefrtult  probabilities 
presented  by  Schwartz  and  Torous  (1992). 
There, the  authors  detine  the  probability  of 
prepayment to be zero when there is a positive 
probability  of  default,  and  vice  versa.  The 
specifications  used  herein  permit  the  coexis- 
tence of  positive probabilities  of sub-optimal 
prepayment and default. but  generally the in- 
cidence  of  each  is  indirectly related. For ex- 
ample, when the difference between actual and 
expected income flow  is equal  to Lero,  there 
is  11  2-percent probability of sub-optimal pre- 
payment  and  a 2-percent  probability  of  sub- 
optimal  default.  As  the  difference  increases 
(decreases),  the  probability  of  sub-optimal 
prepayment  increases  (decreases)  while  the 
probability  of  sub-optimal  default  decreases 
(increases). The coexistence of positive prob- 
abilities  of  sub-optimal prepayment  and  de- 
fault is realistic  in  agricultural given the vol- 
atility of agriculture income. 
In  terms  of  the mortgage,  the  initial  loan 
balance is assumed to be $100 while the loan 
mark-up (5)  is assumed to be 200 basis points. 
Such a  spread  is typical  of  most  agricultural 
mortgages.  Consistent  with  convention, refi- 
nancing costs (5)  are assumed to be  50 basis 
points  [see e.g Bhattacharya  and  Koren 
(1998)] and the specitic mortgage analyzed is 
a  20-year,  tixed-rate mortgage with  constant, 
semi-annual payments. 
Kesults and Discussion 
Presented in  Tables  I  and 2 are AMBS prices 
per  $100 of  outstanding  loan  balance at time 
zero under alternative spot prices, land values, 
prepayment penalties. and prepayment and de- 
fault  assumptions.  'The  main  difference  be- 
tween the two tables is that Table  1  represents 
values when equations ( 13) and ( 14) are used 
for  sub-optimal  mortgage  termination  while 
those  of Table 2 are for PSA-based  sub-opti- 
ma1  prepayment  and  a fixed 3-percent pl-oba- 
bility  of  sub-optimal  default  (included  for 
comparison  purposes).  Not  surprisingly.  the 
results  are nearly  identical  because the linear 
probability  model,  by  construction,  induces 
behavior similar to that of PSA prepayment. 
As  shown  in  Tables  I  and  2, the value of 
AMBS  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  spot 
rate of interest when prepayrnent  penalties are 
in  place. This  is  hecause in  the event of  pre- . 
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Figure  1.  Suboptimal prepayment and default function behavior in relation  to the difference 
between  actual and expected income flow 
payment  (which is  more  readily  induced  by 
high initial spot rates). both yield maintenance 
ancl  partial-open  prepayment  compensate the 
investor for lost interest  income. With the ex- 
ception of  low  initial  spot rates, yielcl  main- 
tenance  also  ensures  a  higher  AMBS  value 
when  co~npared  to  partial-open  prepayment. 
This  result  was  anticipated  given  that  yield 
maintenance  is  in place  until  six  months be- 
fore  maturity  while  partial-open  prepayment 
imposes no prepayment penalty  after the tirst 
two  and  one-half  years.  Given  the  assumed 
term structure, when the initial  spot rate is be- 
low  the  long-term  mean  rate, the yield  curve 
is  LI~W~I-d  sloping,  implying  the  prepayment 
penalty  f'or  yield  maintenance will  always be 
less  than  that  for  partial-open  prepayment 
loans [see ecluations (5)  and (7)l. 
As the initial spot rate increases above the 
long-term  mean  rate.  there  is more and more 
downward  pressure  on  rates  which  rneans 
there  is  potentially  more  and  more  incentive 
for  optimal  prepayment  (which  most  often 
triggers n penalty-especially  under yield 
maintenance).  A  situation  when  no  prepay- 
men1 penalty  i4  in  place  ih a140  presented  In 
Tables  1  and  2  and  graphed in  Figure  2  for 
illustrative  purposes.  When  no  penalty  is  in 
place, the value of AMBS are generally a de- 
creasing and convex function of'the spot rate. 
This is also because there is continually more 
and more incentive to optimally prepay as the 
initial spot rate  increases above the long-tern) 
mean  rate.  but  there is no penalty  in place to 
insure the inve\tor against such an occurrence 
and thereby  increase the security's value. 
Also  shown  in  Tables  1  and  2  is the sen- 
sitivity of  the AMBS value  to the initial land 
price.  Higher  initial  land  prices  imply  lower 
loan-to-value  ratios  and  higher  income  flow, 
both of which lower the probability of default 
(optimal  and  sub-optimal).  However,  as  3 
practical matter. it appears that initial land val- 
ues  have  limited  impact  on the  value of  the 
AMBS on  a  per $100 of  initial  loan  balance 
b,  C~SIS.  .' .  This is likely becau5e  unlike prepayent. 
'lvell  default is rarely an inevitable conclusion g' 
the down payment required and assumed prob- 
abilities. 















































































 Figure 2.  The \;slue of Farmer Mac AMBS for alternative initial spot rates and prepayment 
penalties 
Table 3.  Mean Annual Yield\ on Farmer Mac AMBS Per $100 of  In~tial  Loan Balance Under 
Alternat~ve  Initial  Spot Rate\. Land Value\, and Prepayment Penalties 
No Penalty  Yield Maintenance  p  :II .  t~al-Open  '.  Prepayment 
L(0)  $125  $1.50  S200  $125  $150  $200  $1 25  $150  $200 
Norr: Thesc yicl~is  are based on prices reporled in  Tablc  I the values of AMBS presented in  Table I. As 
shown, yields are an increasing function of the 
spot rate and a slightly decreasing (or at least 
fairly constant) function of initial land values. 
Consider  an  initial  spot  rnte  of  8.50 percent 
and an  initial  land  value  of  $150 with  a cor- 
responding  loan-to-value  ratio  of  two-thirds 
(i.e. $100/$150). Given the ~nortgage  assump- 
tions  above,  the  loan  woiiltl  be  rnade  at  a 
10.50 percent contl-act~lal  rate (spot plus mark- 
up). Yet the equ~lrbri~~m  price of the loan (con- 
ditional  on  the profit  rnaximi~ing  behavior of 
the  mortgagor)  implie\  the  yield  on AMBS 
laying claim to the cash flows of  the  loan  is 
11.32 percent  when  no  prepayment  penalties 
are in place. From Table  1, AMBS would sell 
at discount with no prepayment penalty; hence 
the  yield  is  above  10.50 percent. The impli- 
cation is that not having a prepayment penalty 
in  place is an imperfect means of funding such 
a  loan. This is because the equilibrium  price 
of the security (conditional on the optimal pre- 
payment and default behavior of the mortgag- 
or) implies a yield that is actually higher than 
the contractual rate on the loan. 
Such is not the case with prepayment pen- 
alties however. With prepayment penalties the 
yields are 9.13 percent with yield maintenance 
and  10.05 percent  with  partial  open  prepay- 
ment  under the  same scenario. The value  to 
Farmer  Mac  of  having  prepayment  penalties 
in  place  in  this  setting,  then,  is  209  basis 
points  for  yield  maintenance  and  1 17  basis 
points  for  partial  open  prepayment.  These 
amounts  can  also  be  interpreted  as  amounts 
that  Farmer Mac could offer to banks to pass 
011 to  ~iiortgagors  to  niake  their  loans  more 
competltl\t.  and  compensate  borrower\  tor 
agreelng to a loan with a prepayment penalty. 
More  conci\e  informat~on  regard~ng  the 
value of prepayment  penalt~e\  I\  pre\entecl  In 
Table 4 which \how\ the embedded call optlon 
values to the rnortgagor and the value of pre- 
payment penalties to Farmer Mac ~lncler  alter- 
native initial spot rates and spot  rate volatili- 
ties.  For example, at  5.0-percent  ~unn~~nl  spot 
rate  volatility  and  a 7.50-percent  initial  spot 
rate, the gross value of the embedded call op- 
tion  (the  mortgagor's  right  to  prepay)  is 
$21.93 per  $100 of initial  loan balance. This 
value  is calculated  as the difference between 
the  value  of  two  (default-free) AMBS,  one 
that can  be  prepaid  without  penalty  and one 
that cannot be prepaid at all. 
However, in reality this gross value is split 
between  mortgagor and mortgagee when  pre- 
payment  penaltie\  are  in  place.  With  yield 
maintenance, the gro\\ value to the mortgagor 
drop\ to $5.19 per $100 of initial loan balance 
because  the d~fference  of $16.75 (i.e. $21.93 
- $5.19) is pas\ed onto Farmer Mac when the 
prepayment penalty is in  place. Similarly, the 
same  spot-rate  scenario  indicates  that  under 
partial  open prepayment the mortgagor's right 
to prepay  is valued at $12.14 per $100 of  ini- 
tial  loan  balance  while  the  value  of  having 
partial  open  prepayment  in  place  to  Farmer 
Mac is $9.80 per $100 of  initial  loan balance. 
Commensur;~te  with  tsaditional option pricing 
theory, the value of the embedded call increas- 
e\ with  increases  in  the  initial  \pot rate  and 
volatility  of  the  spot  rate.  Also  important  to 
note is the fhct that prepayment penalties mit- 
igate prepayment.  but  do not  preclude  it  on 
average.  Although  not  presented.  depending 
on the initial spot rnte mean prepayment times 
range between  18 months and three yea-s." 
A similar analysis is possible regarding the 
embedded  put  option  in  mortgages,  namely, 
optirnal default. Table 5 pl-esents valucs of the 
option to default under alternative land values 
and land value volatilities. As shown. the val- 
ue  of  the  mortgagor's  option  to  default  is  a 
decreasing  function  of  land  value  and  an  in- 
creasing  function of  land  value  volatility.  By 
construction,  high  initial  land  values  are as- 
sociated  with  low  initial  loan-to-value  ratios 
(high  down  payments)  which  is  why  some 
very  low  option  prices are noted  in  Table 5. 
When i~~itial  land values are high. incorne ilow 
is  also high. Both  imply  a  low  probability of 
default that when coupled with  low land value 
volatility  leads  to  the  low  option  prices. Be- 
cause the incidence of defili~lt  in such cases is 
"The  fctcr that  yielcl  maintenance  does  tiot  prc- 
cludr pl-epa)mcnr  i\  an i~ltc~-cstinfi  rr.\ult c.\~t~minccl  in 
rhe  ne\t scction.  Either thc penalty  it\cll'  i\  mi\-\pcc.- 
ilieil  and too small to PI-cclude  prepayment  ;111d/(lr  the 
term  stl-~icture  it\cll i\ tni\-\pcuilir~l. Stokes and Briizch:  VuI~~irlg  A~ri~~i~ltiir~il  Mortgage-Racked Se(.i~riti~\  509 
Table  5.  Value  of  Embedded  Put  (Default)  nual  payments  was  assumed  with  an  initial 
Options Under Alternatives  Land  Values  and  loan-to-value ratio of two-thirds, loan markup 
Land Value Volatilities  of 2 percent, ant1 refinancing cost of 0.50 pel-- 
R  cent. The spot rate ciiffusion path over the life 
of  the  loan  was simulated  20,000 times  and. 
LLO)  6.75%  13.50Vr  27.00'7~ 
at each scheduled payment. equation (5)  or (7) 
$125  0.7386  0.7386  5.9089  was applied to determine the relevant  prepay- 
$ I 40  0.1388  0.1388  4'059y  ment penalty. The penalty  was convel-ted to a 
$155  0.01  83  0.0 183  2.794  I 
$170  0.0008  0.0008  basis  point  cost  (y,) and  added  to  the  loan  1.9083 
$185  0.0002  0.0002  inarkup  ([)  and  refinancing cost  (5) to deter- 
$200  0.0000  0.0000  1.0424  mine a hurdle or trigger rate nece\sary  to in- 
Note: An initial apot  rate equal to  the long-term mean  of  duce prepayment. Recall that optimal prepay- 
6.92%  i\ assumed.  ment occurs whenever I-" :  t., + 5  + [ + 7,. 
Table 6 presents the probability of  optimal 
extremely rare. the option has low or no value  prepayment during the first thrce years of  the 
to the mortgagor.  loan ~~nder  yield  maintenance and partial open 
prepayment  penalties  for  alternative  initial 
Precluding Prepayment  spot rates and spot rate volatilities. As shown. 
low initial spot rates rarely induce optimal pre- 
[n this  section the incidence of optimal  pre-  payment over the first three years of the loan 
payment  in  spite of prepayment  penalties  is  for any level of  spot rate  volatility.  However. 
investigated. To conduct the analysis, a simu-  as the initial spot rate increases andlor the vol- 
lation model of mortgage prepayment was de-  atility  of the spot rate  increases, an  increaeii 
veloped.  A  20-year  mortgage  with  semi-an-  incidence  of  optimal  prepayment  is  ob- 
Table 6.  The Conditional Probab~lity  of Optimal Prepayment During thc Fir\t Three Years of 
the Life of a Loan for Alternative Initial Spot Rates and Spot Kate V~lat~l~ties 
Yield M(iirztrr~cln~,c, 
tr  = 5%  6 mo.7.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  (T  = 5o/r  6  rno.s. 
12 rnos.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0024  12 17lo.s. 
IS mos.  0.0000  0.000  1  0.0267  18 ttzo.\. 
24 to  0.0000  0.0002  0.  I067  24 ~no.s. 
.30  nlo.s.  0.0000  0.0002  0.2390  .<O  t~ros. 
36 no  0.0000  0.0005  0.38  1 1  -36  IIIO,~. 
tr  = 10%.  6 mos.  0.000  1  0.0029  0.0089  (T  =  I  Oc,4  6 rizo,s. 
12 mo.~. 0.0000  0.0  1 15  0.0693  I? I?Io.\. 
I  to..  0.0000  0.0237  0.  1723  18  tt~o.\. 
4 to. 0.0000  0.0326  0.2764  24 1110,s. 
30 mos.  0.0000  0.0397  0.372  1  -30 ltro,s. 
36  ~no.s.  0.0000  0.0454  0.4555  -36  1110.5. 
tr = 20 '%  6 rnos.  0.00 13  0.028  1  0.0493  tr  = 20%  6  t11o.~. 
12  ri~o.\.  0.0007  0.0655  0.  1645  12 III(J.\. 
18 lnos.  0.0004  0.0003  0.3600  18 I)IO.\. 
24 tnos.  0.0002  0.1 157  0.3572  24 tt1o.s. 
30 mos.  0.0002  0.  1284  0.4305  .<O  n1o.s. 
36 mos.  0.000  1  0.1372  0.4924  -36  tllos. 
An initial  land value  of 3\50  per $100 of inihal loan ha\ance ii a'\umed served."  The fact that yield maintenance does 
not preclude optimal prepay~nent  is consistent 
with  research  on  commercial  mortgages  by 
Lefcot. (1 999). 
Similar  results  are  noted  for partial  open 
prepayment  loans.  Notice  the relatively high 
probability  of  prepayment  in  month  36  (i.e. 
the 6Ih payIlletit on the loan). Recall that partial 
open prepayment loans only have prepayment 
penalties  during  the  first  two  rind  one-half 
years of  the  loan  which  implies  that  the 6"' 
payment is  the first  lime when prepayment is 
not  penalized.  Interestingly,  increased  spot- 
rate volatility appears to affect the probability 
of  optimal  prepayment differenlly depending 
on the prepayment penalty  involved. For ex- 
ample.  lor an  initial  spot rate of  10 percent, 
increasing the spot rate volatility increases the 
probability of prepayment  under  yield  main- 
tenance. However, under partial  open prepay- 
ment this occurrence is only noted during the 
first  18 months of the  loan.  After that  time, 
increases in  the volatility  of the spot rate ac- 
tually decrease the probability  of prepayment. 
Summary and  Conclusions 
The purpose of  this research ha\ been to de- 
velop  and  analy~e  n  model  of  Farmer  Mac 
mortgage-backed  securities  and  the  prepay- 
ment penalties used by Farmer Mac. Agricul- 
tural  properties  are  \imilar  to  commercial 
properties  in  that  they  are income producing 
and impose some form of prepayment restric- 
tion.  The lenders'  preferences  for  self-liqui- 
dating loans was captured by tying the service 
or income flow  of the  mortgaged  property  to 
the  probabilities  of sub-optimal  default  and 
sub-optimal prepayment. Like other mortgage- 
backed security models, the model developed 
here allows for a quantification of default and 
prepayment risk  by  uncovering the embedded 
call and put  options in the mortgage. Another 
It should he noted  that thc null hypothesis hcing 
tcstcd i\ whethcr r*: 5 r, + [ +  + y,  with the prob- 
abilities reported  in Table 6 hcing the probability  that 
the  null hypothcsis i.;  rejected. Consequently, the  hy- 
pothesis ithell'presupposes  hat  < ade~luately  covers the 
nior(papor's cost of retinar~cing  and that nrl? depr-cc  01' 
inc.q~la1il.v  ;thc,\,c  in~luce  pl-epa~  rtlent. 
innovation of this research was the implemen- 
tation of a path-wise Monte Carlo simulation1 
dynamic programming approach to numerical- 
ly solve a complex partial differential equation 
characterizing the value of  the security. Final- 
ly,  we analyze prepayment  penalties used by 
Farmer Mac to determine their  ability  to ac- 
tual  I y preclude prepayment. 
The results indicate that yield maintenance 
generally  offers  investors  more  prepayment 
risk  protection  than  partial  open  prepaylnent 
penalties.  As such,  the  value  of  agricultural 
mortgage-hacked  securities  with  yield  main- 
tenance have more value and, therefore, lower 
yields. The yield  recluction can be interpreted 
as the  minimum  interest  rate  break  a  Farm 
Credit Systern or cornniercial bank could offer 
potential  mortgagors to induce them to accept 
a loan with  a specific prepayment penalty im- 
posed  by  Farmer Mac. In  a  similar way, de- 
fault risk is quantified and the option to default 
is determined to be generally of limited value 
to the  mortgagor  in  the  case of  agricultilral 
real estate. It was also demonstrated that pre- 
payment  penalties, while offering investors a 
natural shield against prepayment risk, are an 
imperfect means of' accon~plishing  such an ob- 
jective. Profit maximizing mortgagors can still 
find  sit~~ations  where prepayment  is advanta- 
geous even after bearing the cost of the pre- 
payment  penalty  and nominal  refinancing 
costs. 
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